The water supply system, designed in the nineChoosing the operator teenth century and restructured in the midtwentieth, drew on raw water that was of good Once the decision had been made to involve quality by world standards, and until 1989 treatthe private sector in providing treatment sysment went little further than screening, disintems, important questions arose about how fection, and fluoridation. But as water quality many contracts should be awarded and what guidelines became more stringent, Sydney's raw restrictions should be placed on successful water came under increasing stress.
tenderers. The Board determined that three contracts would be awarded for the four proposed After establishing that consumers were willing treatment systems, combining the two smallest to pay for maintaining the quality, the Board systems under a single contract. The successful decided to contract for a privately built, owned, bidder for the largest project would be ineliand operated (BOO) system for water treatment.
gible to tender for the other two. Under the proResponsibility for harvesting and storing raw tocol for accepting bids, only bidders that had water and delivering treated water would renot successfully bid for one of the other conmain with the Board (and later, Sydney Water).
tracts, and that met the minimum acceptable Several factors persuaded the Board to adopt technical standards, would be considered. the BOO system for water treatment. It faced major capital outlays to upgrade and expand The initial allocation of bargaining power under wastewater treatment capacity. There was a these procedures helps set the basis for negotiagrowing likelihood that it would be corporatized, tions that may be required during the life of a making a 'delegated service" approach involvcontract. For example, if it became necessary to ing the private sector and providing access to a expand plant capacity during a contract, the water full range of international technology attractive. treatment company would need to renegotiate And the subsequent involvement of seventeen water tariffs to recover its expansion costs. By consortia in the "tournament" for the market reopting for several operators, the Board gains acvealed a level of competition likely to produce cess to information from each that can be used outcomes that the Board, relatively inexperias a benchmark in assessing the performance of enced with filtration systems, would find diffithe others and in negotiating tariff adjustments. cult to match. In 1993, the Board contracted with It also gains access to a wider range of water two consortia-Australian Water Systems and treatment technologies, strengthening its hand in North-West Transfield-for two water treatment future expansions and upgrading. plants. A third contract was let to another consortium, Wyuna Water, in 1994. By the end of This approach has costs, however. For example, the century, almost all the drinking water conthe successful bidders for the second and third
Risk sharing
bidders meeting the Board's minimum technical specifications. And if firms could win all The Board put the tariff structure in the benchthree contracts, they might offer more attracmark tenders to provide what it considered adtive bids, reflecting size economies and any equate protection for the financiers against the expected benefits in subsequent bargaining.
financial risks associated with the projects' large The Board minimized the cost to the system of fixed costs, while leaving the consortia to bear this exclusionary protocol by awarding the largrisks relating to volume-related operating costs. est of the three contracts first.
It priced treatment at cost at the margin to protect consumer interests. And as the following Two other factors affected the selection proparagraphs show, the Board structured the wacess. The Water Board prepared its own reter treatment agreements according to the prinports and design plans. This gave it a fallback ciple that specific risks should reside with the option should the BOO approach have to be parties best able to assess and manage them. abandoned for some reason. The detailed process specification in these studies, later proCompletion and commissioning risks. The wavided to the tenderers, yielded important time ter treatment company is responsible for comand cost savings to the successful tenderers.
pleting the project on time and to specifications The Board also established a capability to asthat meet agreed acceptance tests demonstratsess bids and negotiate the final terms of waing that the plant is ready for continued use at ter treatment agreements. This required the the required capacity. The water treatment agreeBoard to incur substantial costs in setting up a ment assigns the completion and commissionnew legal and commercial "infrastructure." The ing risks to the water treatment company through Board wanted to be able to deal with the riskthe availability component of the tariff, which sharing implications of the BOO path, and the is based on the fixed costs expected under timely
Board's legal advisers recommended that it completion of the construction phase. cover contingencies in great detail and anticipate a wide variety of specific events that could Market risks. Although the fixed availability affect its risks. charge in the tariff partly insures the water treatment company against plant usage that falls
The water treatment tariff structure short of the designed capacity, the company otherwise bears the risks of fluctuating demand The water treatment tariff structure agreed to from Sydney Water by agreeing to meet all has two parts.' First, an availability charge is demand. The contract specifies that Sydney fixed, independent of the volume treated, to Water must assist the water treatment company cover about 80 percent of the financing, esin designing capacity to meet demand by protablishment, and fixed costs incurred by the viding information on its demand management water treatment companies in the timely constrategy, including demand projections for the struction and operation of the plant. Penalnext two, five, and ten years. ties are charged in the event of breakdown. Second, a usage charge is set, a megaliter rate Granting exclusive rights to treat water for a that declines with quantity. The agreed tariffs designated market involves tradeoffs. The govare subject to change if the treated water falls ernment-through the Board-has tied its short of the quality specified in the contract hands with respect to competition for the conor the quality of the raw water supplied for tract-winning treatment plants. But the contracts treatment either exceeds or falls below pathemselves should reflect this exclusivity, in rameters based on the highest and lowest the terms offered by the treatment companies. water quality over the preceding twenty-five If the Board's demand projections miss the mark years.
and capacity increases are called for, the contract provides for adjustments to the tariff to accords with the company's full autonomy in shift risk arising from inadequate projections daily operations under the water treatment away from the water treatment company.
agreement. The operators expect that contracts will be renewed at the end of the contract pePerformance quality and quantity risks. These riod. This expectation and a provision allowing risks lie with the water treatment company proSydney Water to buy the plant assets at a price vided they do not involve plant expansion, in based on its own evaluation provide incentives which case the risks would be shared through for the operators to avoid running down the a renegotiated tariff. If the water treatment comassets toward the end of the contract period. pany fails to meet quality standards or required volumes, Sydney Water has recourse to three Upstream risks. Sydney Water will continue to measures: tariff reduction or nonpayment, stepbe responsible for operating and maintaining in rights, and termination of the contract. Moniassets "upstream" of the treatment process. toring provisions give Sydney Water the right These include the catchment, the river systems to satisfy itself that the water treatment comwithin it, and any canals, pipelines, dams, and pany is operating and maintaining the plant in reservoirs used in storing and reticulating the accordance with the water treatment agreement. raw water. In announcing its catchment manIf Sydney Water finds that the company is failagement policy during the bidding process, the ing to do so, it will notify the company. which
Board committed itself to a set of environmental must respond with an action plan to be agreed standards to reduce uncertainty for tenderers. upon. The company will carry out approved quality tests whose results will be subject to Financing and economic risks. The water treataudit, and Sydney Water will have the right to ment company carries the risks of changes in conduct its own tests. Disputes over results will interest or inflation rates during the construcbe settled by a third party. tion period. But once the plant is commissioned, an indexing formula will take effect that will Raw water supply risks. Whereas the risks reallocate the risks of inflation and changes in lating to the output (clean bulk water) reside operating costs between the company and entirely with the water treatment company, risks Sydney Water. Few details have been revealed relating to the variable quality of the input (raw about this important aspect of risk sharing. water) are shared by Sydney Water and the company. The quality of the raw water that Sydney Technology risks. The water treatment company Water harvests in its catchments is only partly bears the responsibility for technology, which under its control because of storms and floods. must be proven and must meet required stanThe water treatment agreement accounts for this dards and specifications. But the contract specipartial control by specifying that, to avoid a penfies that changes in water quality requirements alty tariff under the terms of the contract, Sydney that call for new technology will trigger a reWater must provide raw water whose quality negotiation of the tariff, thereby sharing the falls within a range established over the past risks of unforeseen changes in the standards twenty-five years. This provision gives Sydney agreed to in the water treatment agreement. Water an incentive to manage its catchments so that raw water quality is at least maintained in
The water treatment agreement specifies apthe established range.
propriate contractual terms for technology transfer to Sydney Water and serves as the baOperation and maintenance risks. The risks of sis for a collaborative and cooperative relationoperating and maintaining the plant-functions ship between the Board and the water treatment that include providing staffing, skills, chemical company. The water treatment company is exsupplies, power, process control, and disposalpected to keep abreast of technology, perform reside with the water treatment company. This on-site research, and share findings with Sydney
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Water. This expectation is formalized by a comdesired standard. By shifting the risk associated ponent in the negotiated tariff to cover research with poor catchment management back to and development costs of the water treatment Sydney Water, the tariff structure provides an company.
incentive for Sydney Water to manage the catchment well. The agreement also gives a discount Natural disasters. In an emergency, whether in the tariff for raw water that is of exceptionor not caused by natural disaster, Sydney Waally high quality. If Sydney Water had built and ter has the right to take whatever action it operated the treatment plants itself, there would deems necessary to safeguard the system's sealso have been incentives to find efficient comcurity and maintain supply, including bypassbinations of treating water and improving catching the treatment plants. In such events, Sydney ment management. Water will compensate the water treatment company, reimbursing access fees and treat- 
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